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Global commodity markets are affected by a variety 
of government policies that may expand or lower 
overall supply and as a result affect world prices for the 
specific products concerned. Market failures and market 
structures (market power along the value chain) also 
affect supply. This paper briefly reviews a number of 
factors that may distort international commodity markets 
with a view to identifying elements of an agenda for 
multilateral cooperation to reduce such distortions. Much 
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of the policy agenda that arises is domestic and requires 
action by national governments. But numerous policies 
—or absence of policy—generate international spillovers 
that call for the negotiation of international policy 
disciplines. Independent of whether distortions are local 
or international in scope, the complexity of prevailing 
market structures and their impacts on efficiency 
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Introduction 
World commodity markets—and particularly the markets for agricultural commodities—remain 
highly distorted despite the wave of liberalization that has swept world trade since the 1980s. 
These markets are distorted on both the export and the import side, with serious implications for 
world prices and their volatility.  Market failures abound in the production of many commodities. 
These include inadequate pricing of many common-pool resources, externalities associated with 
the extraction and use of commodities such as fossil fuels, and massive externalities associated 
with the production of many agricultural, forestry and fish products. Very few of the price 
distortions found in commodity markets can be justified as dealing with such market failures, 
although ex post justifications along these lines are sometimes offered. Rather, most of these 
distortions are designed to achieve redistributions of income by raising or lowering prices in a 
way that will transfer resources to favored groups. To the extent that they do contribute to 
reducing any of the problems of market failure, this is typically coincidental.  
There remains much that can be done at national, regional and global levels to reduce the 
existing distortions and improve outcomes worldwide—ideally in conjunction with introducing 
policies to reduce the adverse consequences of the profound market failures existing in many 
markets. However, without an understanding of the forms, objectives and effects of the various 
interventions by governments, it will be very difficult to secure reform that will enhance world 
welfare. The objectives of these national policies are frequently quite complex and 
nontransparent. In many cases, there are multiple objectives, such as raising or lowering the 
average level of a commodity price, but also reducing its variability. Tracing through the effects 
can also be complex, with ultimate impacts frequently quite different than they might at first 
appear. Since the effects of various measures are often interdependent and instruments may be 
strongly substitutable, we take a broad approach in inventorying the policies used. Reform 
efforts require a good understanding of the objectives and political economy forces influencing 
policies in a particular area, or reform is likely to encounter unexpected resistance. The same 
applies to efforts to design and negotiate new international disciplines that aim to reduce the 
negative cross-border pecuniary spillovers created by national policies. 
In this paper, we first provide a description of the broad types of intervention prevailing 
in and affecting global commodity markets. We begin in Section 1 with a discussion of the most 3 
 
common type of intervention in commodity markets: actions designed to affect the domestic 
price of a commodity relative to its international price. Most attention with this type of measure 
has focused on interventions designed to increase the level of the domestic price relative to the 
international price using instruments such as tariffs. However, there are also many types of 
intervention designed to reduce domestic prices relative to international prices in order, for 
example, to lower the price of an input used in a politically powerful industry. In Section 2 we 
discuss another politically-important type of intervention: measures aimed at reducing the 
volatility of domestic prices relative to world prices. In Section 3 we turn to a discussion of the 
implications for multilateral cooperation and rule-making efforts. Section 4 concludes. 
1.  Measures Affecting the Level of Prices 
Measures designed to affect the level of commodity prices have received the most attention in 
the economic literature because of their prevalence. These measures can be divided into those 
that attempt to influence the domestic price relative to external prices, and those—mostly on the 
export side—that seek to influence the level of world prices. There is a dizzying array of 
measures of this type, many of which have been used for a very long time.
1  A brief list of major 
measures of these types is given in Table 1. All of these instruments affect trade, acting on either 
volumes or prices. 
Table 1. Some measures designed to influence commodity price levels 
Policy instrument  Import side  Export side 
Border measures  Import duties/subsidies  Export taxes/subsidies 
Quantitative restrictions  Quotas, licenses, etc.  Export restrictions/bans 
Public monopoly  State trading  State trading 
Competition policy  Anti-cartel enforcement; 
parallel imports/exhaustion regime 
Antitrust exemptions for 
private export cartels 
Contingent protection  Antidumping, safeguards   
International agreements    Export cartels 
Production controls    Production cartels 
Subsidies  Production subsidies  Export subsidies 
 
A huge literature has emerged seeking to understand the reasons behind the use of 
measures designed to change the level of domestic prices relative to world prices. Two broad 
                                                 
1 For a partial list of measures used or envisaged in the 18
th Century, see Hamilton (1791). 4 
 
explanations for the emergence of trade barriers have been identified. The first focuses on the 
political-economy factors that influence the level and the economic costs of protection. The 
second considers the terms-of-trade implications of trade barriers.
2  
The political-economy explanation for protection relies on the fact that some producers 
are better organized to seek support from governments than are other sectors, and consumers. 
The political economy explanation is relevant to a variety of underlying objectives. In practice a 
common objective of groups seeking support is to increase domestic economic activity, and this 
can be pursued through a mix of instruments, ranging from import protection to taxation of 
exports of inputs used by an industry. Thus we include under this heading industrial policy 
arguments and objectives.
3 While policy makers recognize that protection creates economic 
inefficiencies and costs, the political-economy benefits to them are believed to outweigh these 
costs enough to generate substantial rates of protection even when the benefits to politicians of 
campaign contributions are only modestly higher than their perceptions of the social costs of 
protection (Goldberg and Maggi 1999).
4 Negotiations about import protection to a particular 
industry also tend to be heavily influenced by the specific situation of that industry, without 
taking into account the general-equilibrium implications for other sectors. However, the 
cumulative effect of decisions to grant protection to industries that are collectively important is 
to impose cost burdens on the exporting sectors both directly by raising the costs of (protected) 
inputs and indirectly by raising the prices of nontraded goods. International trade negotiations 
can change the political-economy balance by causing export interests that are adversely affected 
by protection to become engaged in the political process (Anderson, 2010). 
Protection may also be motivated by a desire to benefit at the expense of foreigners. 
Import protection may generate a benefit to the country by reducing the price that it pays 
suppliers for imported goods. The cumulative effect of import protection or the direct effect of 
export taxation may be to increase the prices received for exported goods (Broda, Limão and 
Weinstein 2008). If a country possesses monopoly power for a product, some type of export 
                                                 
2 In this paper we abstract from revenue considerations as a motivation for taxation of trade. In practice trade is often 
an important source of revenue for governments of low income countries. 
3 The common element underpinning the intervention in trade is to move away from a neutral incentive regime, i.e., 
to differentiate between sectors in terms of the effective taxation they confront. 
4 The framework often used for political economy analyses of trade policy is Grossman and Helpman (1994). See 
Gawande and Hoekman (2006) for an application of the Grossman-Helpman framework to agricultural policies in 
the United States. 5 
 
restraint will be optimal from the perspective of maximizing national welfare. Whether it does so 
depends on whether the government is able to determine the right level of the restriction—which 
will be a function of the elasticity of demand for product, the existence of substitutes, etc.  While 
the use of export restraints in situations where a country has market power may make economic 
sense – e.g., Tarr (2010) concludes that the export taxes that are imposed by the Russian 
Federation on natural gas very substantially benefit Russia and raise Russian welfare– it is easy 
to get it wrong. Thus, Tarr (2010) also finds that the optimal export tax on timber for Russia – 
another product in which the country has the ability to influence world prices – is around 12 
percent, half the level of what was being imposed in 2009 and much less than the 80 percent 
level that was proposed by the government.  
Whether import duties and export taxes are explained by political economy or terms-of-
trade arguments, the determinants of these measures tend to be couched in terms of levels. The 
Grossman-Helpman (1994) model, for instance, explains high rates of protection in terms of 
generally stable factors such as the import demand elasticity (which influences the cost of 
providing protection); the share of domestic output in total production (which determines how 
much of the benefit of the protection provided accrues to interest groups, rather than the national 
budget); and whether the sector is organized to lobby for protection. Where export barriers are 
used for political-economy reasons—as, for example, to drive down the price of a commodity 
used as an input by a more politically-powerful ―preferred‖ sector—the same stability in tax rates 
is likely expected. If policy is driven by terms-of-trade objectives protection will be higher in 
commodities for which the foreign elasticity of export supply is low (and hence an import barrier 
will improve national income by reducing import prices to a greater degree). Similar arguments 
apply to export restrictions used to improve the terms of trade and to measures resulting from 
imperfect competition.  
Quantitative restrictions, including bans on imports or exports, are sometimes used to 
restrain trade. Relative to price-based measures such as tariffs or export taxes, they have the 
disadvantage that their impacts on domestic prices are nontransparent. It is difficult to know, for 
example, how much an import quota of 1000 tonnes restricts trade and raises prices. Only by 
converting it into an import tariff equivalent can we begin to gauge how much it restricts trade. 
Even if a quota has roughly the initially-desired degree of trade restrictiveness, the extent to 
which it restricts trade can change sharply as the domestic demand or supply changes in response 6 
 
to subsequent shocks. When a quota or license becomes restrictive of trade, it becomes valuable. 
While the allocation of quotas or licenses in this situation can be a way to compensate domestic 
losers and achieve policy reform, this process does not raise government revenues, and can easily 
result in corruption. 
State-trading systems, under which the right to trade is allocated only to one or a few 
firms, are frequently used to manage agricultural trade. When these firms are directly controlled 
by the government, the resulting system can operate just like a quota regime, with the 
government choosing the quantity to be imported or exported.
5 If the firms have autonomy in the 
amounts they trade, the outcome may involve reductions in the volume of trade that depend upon 
the firms‘ perceptions about the elasticity of market demand, and their conjectures about the 
behavior of their competitors (McCorriston and MacLaren 2011). Such arrangements may 
involve the state-trading enterprise setting prices on the input side (e.g., credit, seeds, transport) 
as well as for the output that is produced. Under GATT rules, any regime in which firms have 
exclusive or special privileges in trading is classified as a state trading regime and must abide by 
the nondiscrimination rules (WTO 1995, p. 509).
6  
Where monopolies or oligopolies in trade arise in the absence of government privileges—
perhaps because of the size of the market—there may be similar issues to those arising with state 
trading enterprises. In this case, however, in principle the threat of entry provides an important 
check on the exploitation of market power, and national competition legislation (antitrust 
enforcement) can be used to discipline illegal restrictive business practices. As has been 
documented extensively, commodity value chains are characterized by imperfect competitively 
market structures (e.g., Connor, 2003). Domestic processors for example often have a degree of 
market power, as do suppliers of certain types of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, chemicals) – a number 
of which have formed international cartels at different points in time, including in recent years 
(Bolotova, Connor and Miller, 2005). Similar economic effects can arise from the 
(non)application of antitrust law as derive from trade policies affecting exports and imports. 
                                                 
5 Irwin (1996) points out that the term ―free trade‖ originally emerged in parliamentary debates at the end of the 
sixteenth century as an antonym for trade conducted through firms given trading rights by the government, rather 
than as a goal of trade not subject to measures such as tariffs. 
6 See Hoekman and Trachtman (2008) for a discussion of a case brought against the Canadian Wheat Board and the 
reach of the applicable WTO rules. The Appellate Body has ruled that WTO rules do not imply ―comprehensive 
competition-law-type obligations‖ on state-trading enterprises (WTO, 2004b, para. 145). 7 
 
Examples include exemptions for national firms for behavior on export markets—such as export 
cartels —that would otherwise be illegal, as long as the actions do not have negative effects on 
consumers in the home market, and the extraterritorial application of antitrust law for the benefit 
of national consumers.  In recent years increasing attention has been given in policy circles to 
potential competition concerns arising from the expansion of global value chains and increasing 
concentration at specific segments of such chains. We come back to this below. 
Contingent protection measures such as antidumping, safeguards and countervailing 
duties are typically used less frequently in markets for agricultural and mineral commodities than 
for manufactures. They are, however, widely used in markets for products such as chemicals, for 
which the marginal costs of production are low and prices volatile, and hence likely to fall 
frequently below the overall cost of production.
7 
Production and export quotas were central elements of the International Commodity 
Agreements administered by UNCTAD (Rieber 1985, Raffaelli 1995). They were used in an 
attempt to restrict the supply of commodities and hence to raise their world prices, driven in part 
by the Prebisch-Singer argument that demand for commodities was income inelastic and that the 
terms of trade for commodity exporters would therefore decline over time as countries grow 
richer. Much of the concern in the 1970s about price levels appears to have been based on the 
view that high rates of technological change were driving down prices and therefore creating 
problems for producers—a concern that seems surprising when one recalls that productivity 
growth lowers production costs.
8 Typically, they were coupled with buffer stock arrangements 
intended to stabilize prices in the short term. Production and export quotas created serious 
problems of allocating and enforcing quotas, given strong incentives to cheat on reduction 
commitments. The buffer stocks proved much more difficult to use for price stabilization, given 
declining prices for most of the period, with excessive accumulation of stocks almost invariably 
occurring at some stage. These agreements were introduced for a wide range of commodities, 
including coffee, cocoa, rubber and sugar. As discussed by Williams and Wright (1991), the 
buffer stock elements of these schemes frequently suffered from explosive accumulation of 
                                                 
7 See Bown (2011) for recent analyses of the use of contingent protection by different jurisdictions. 
8 The effect of technical change on producer profits depends on the nature of the technical change and that, with 
some types of technical change, producer gains from cost reduction may be less than the losses resulting from price 
declines (Martin and Alston, 1997; Ivanic and Martin 2010). 8 
 
stocks and all schemes of this type ultimately failed, as did similar schemes such as the Reserve 
Price scheme for wool in Australia.  
Subsidies have been used extensively to support farmers in OECD countries. While 
output-based subsidies distort production, research suggests they have a much smaller impact on 
world prices than border measures. Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004) and Anderson, Martin 
and Valenzuela (2006) estimate that border barriers accounted for 80-90 percent of the impact on 
world prices and thus welfare. Subsidies expand domestic production in the process reducing 
imports by lowering the cost (price) of domestic output. In the absence of border barriers the 
effect of a production subsidy to domestic producers is to expand output by raising returns per 
unit of output. While imports fall, absent border measures domestic prices are unaffected, as is 
total domestic consumption, so there is no consumer deadweight loss. Border protection on 
imports is also important for the potential magnitude of any export subsidies. Export subsidies 
that seek to raise the domestic price above import parity plus the tariff will likely be unsuccessful 
in doing so. 
An important difference that characterizes political economy from terms-of-trade 
motivated trade policy and related interventions in commodity markets is that in the case of the 
former the probability that intervention raises national welfare is lower than for the latter.
9 
Whatever the motivation, the interventions are likely to generate negative spillovers for other 
countries, giving rise to an incentive to cooperate and negotiate reciprocally binding disciplines 
on the use of specific policies. However, as the terms-of-trade changes that result from large 
countries restricting exports or imports can generate benefits to an individual country, it will be 
necessary that any such cooperation compensates countries for the welfare losses they will incur 
by revoking their ability to impose the externality.  In principle, international agreement can 
improve on the initial welfare of countries with the ability to affect their terms of trade (Bagwell 
and Staiger 2011).
10 If policies are driven by political-economy motivations it may be the case 
                                                 
9 Although from a global point of view, improvements in the terms of trade are purely transfers, and removal of 
these barriers generally increases world income by reducing the efficiency costs of these distortions.  
10 Unfortunately for those seeking to analyze the implications of trade reforms and inform the negotiating process, 
the distribution of these gains may be uneven. It is necessary to take into account the distribution of net gains for a 
complete assessment of the gains from any reform. Further, the gains from exploitation of terms of trade are 
national, rather than global, with international trade negotiations one approach to improving on the sub-optimal 
global equilibrium that may result from individual countries seeking to maximize their terms of trade. 9 
 
that unilateral reforms offer the possibility of attaining the underlying objective at less cost to 
society.  
1.1.  Agricultural markets 
For a number of reasons, many agricultural commodities tend to be protected relatively heavily 
in the industrial countries. These reasons include:  (i) that food tends to be a small share of the 
consumption expenditures of consumers in these countries; (ii) that many agricultural 
commodities are final goods, for which there is little countervailing pressure from organized 
using industries (other than processors who can pass on the higher costs); (iii) the number of 
farmers tends to be relatively small in high-income countries, making it relatively easy for them 
to coordinate in order to apply political pressure; and (iv) that farmers in these countries are 
commercially-oriented, selling virtually all of their output, and using substantial amounts of 
purchased intermediate inputs—creating leverage between their output prices and their net 
returns.  
Historically, agricultural products in developing countries have tended to be taxed, for 
reasons that are the obverse of those applying in the high income countries. These include: (i) the 
fact that food expenditures are frequently a large share of the income of most people; (ii) that the 
number of farmers tends to be large, making it hard for them to organize politically; (iii) that 
urban consumers are a relatively small group, able to organize on an issue like food prices; (iv) 
that farmers are mainly subsistence-oriented—selling only part of their output and using 
relatively few intermediate inputs. In some developing countries, taxation of agricultural exports 
has historically been an important source of revenues, one that was particularly important before 
the emergence of the value-added tax.  
A recent comprehensive study of agricultural distortions led by Kym Anderson (2009) 
shows that agricultural distortions in the industrial countries generally remain large, although 
there are signs that they may have begun to decline from their high levels in the mid-1980s. This 
is particularly the case when we consider the protection that is not decoupled from output 
decisions. In developing countries, the average rate of taxation of agriculture has declined 
sharply, as shown in Figure 1, and switched to modestly positive assistance. The changes in these 
rates of assistance reflect a dramatic sea-change in the pattern of agricultural distortions in 
developing countries, perhaps related to the high rates of economic growth in developing 10 
 
countries in the latter period of the sample, and the sharp shift away from dependence on exports 
of commodities towards reliance on exports of manufactures.  
 
Figure 1. Average nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, five year averages 1955-2004 
 
Source:  www.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
 
The extent of taxation of developing countries in the early period of the sample is 
understated by the data on nominal rates of assistance presented in Figure 1, as the agricultural 
sector was also taxed indirectly by the protection provided to the non-agricultural sector. This 
raised input costs both directly through increases in the price of inputs, and indirectly through 
increases in the prices of nontraded goods and wages—the so-called real exchange appreciation 
resulting from protection. The full extent of the taxation of developing-country agriculture is 
shown using the Relative Rate of Assistance in Figure 2. This shows that a very large share of 
the reduction in the total burden of taxation of agriculture reflects reductions in the protection 
provided to other sectors. Sub-Saharan Africa is today the only developing country region where 
farmers still confront net taxation relative to other sectors.  Matters are made worse because of 
weaknesses in infrastructure, inefficient logistics, etc. that result in high transport-related costs, 
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benefit rural communities.
11 Prevailing market structures, including market power in downstream 
segments of the production/value chain may also weaken the link between world and local farm 
gate prices for farmers, especially in developing countries.
12 
 
Figure 2. The Relative Rate of Assistance to Developing-Country Agriculture, %. 
 
Source: Anderson (2009) and www.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
 
Within developing country agriculture, there is a sharp difference in the rates of 
protection provided to import-competing agriculture and to export-oriented agriculture, as shown 
in Figure 3. The almost complete elimination of taxation of agriculture has sharply reduced the 
cost of distortions on export-oriented agriculture in developing-countries. The rise in protection 
to import-competing agriculture has substantially raised the costs associated with this form of 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Aksoy and Hoekman (2010). 
12 See for example McCorriston, Sheldon and Sexton (2004), Sheldon (2006), Sexton,. Sheldon, McCorriston and 
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Fig. 3. Nominal Rates of Assistance to Developing Country Agriculture by Trade Status, % 
 
Source: Five year averages from Anderson (2009) and www.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
 
Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) produced by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) provide a measure of the extent to which farmers are 
being assisted over time by governments through various payments and price support policies. 
The PSE expresses the monetary value of policy-induced transfers from consumers and 
taxpayers to producers and can be expressed as a percentage of gross farm receipts. Support to 
producers in high income countries was estimated to be US$227 billion in 2010, accounting for 
18 percent of gross farm receipts – the lowest percentage on record (OECD, 2011). The changes 
in the levels of PSEs in 2010 were mostly driven by changes (often increases) in world prices 
and exchange rate movements. However, more than half of support to farmers continues to be 
delivered in ways that are highly distortive of trade and competition. The EU and China currently 
                                                 
13 As is the case with any reform or price shock there will be winners and losers: winners from higher food prices 
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have the highest PSEs. Agricultural support levels have been increasing rapidly in China and are 
getting close to the OECD average in percentage terms (OECD, 2011).  
Since September 2008, the introduction of trade restrictive measures on food has 
accounted for one-quarter of all new trade restrictions imposed (Gillson and Datt, 2011). A 
noteworthy feature of trade policy action since then has been that countries have pursued 
liberalization as well as protection, in an effort to lower prices for households and industries 
(Datt, Hoekman and Malouche, 2011). Some countries increased their tariffs on food products 
substantially. For example, Russia increased tariffs to 50-80 percent on imports of pigs, pork and 
poultry. However, far more frequent in recent years have been tariff reductions on food imports 
as governments tried to contain domestic price increases. Half of all food tariff reductions were 
on grains and sugar. Export restrictions have also been used in attempts to stabilize domestic 
food prices, mainly affecting grains. The most frequent users of new food trade restrictions have 
been emerging market economies such as Russia, India, Indonesia and China. In a sample of 58 
developing countries‘ policy responses during the 2008 food crisis, some 40 percent lowered 
taxes on food; 30 percent controlled prices and/or resorted to consumer subsidies; and, 20 
percent introduced export restrictions (World Bank, 2009). 
In recent years analysts and policy advocates have raised concerns that changes in the 
supply chain and market organization of commodities may impact on commodity price levels. 
For example, DFID, Fox and Vorley (2004) argue that ―excessive concentration within input 
markets (such as seeds and agrochemicals) and output markets (trading, processing, 
manufacturing and retailing) can work against the interests of small producers in developing 
countries, either by creating barriers to market entry, or by worsening the terms on which they 
engage in trade.‖ The concern is that monopoly power of providers of inputs and/or monopsony 
power on the part of buyers (trading companies; retailers) lower domestic farm gate prices and/or 
results in retail prices that are higher than they would be if the relevant markets were 
characterized by greater competition.
14 
                                                 
14 The argument is summarized in a statement by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food (De Schutter, 2001), 
which argues that disproportionate buyer power, arising from excessive concentration of commodity buyers, food 
processors and retailers tends to depress prices for food, lowering incomes of farmers and wages of farm  workers. 
See also Dodd and Asfaha (2008). 14 
 
Since the 2008 food price spike, significant policy attention has been given to the 
question whether changing market structures and food supply chains give rise to competition 
concerns because of excessive concentration/market power in certain parts of the supply chain—
especially ―buyer power‖ by retailers. The EU launched a process of consultations with national 
competition agencies in the Union on whether and how imperfect competition in the food supply 
chain is prevalent, driven by perceived asymmetries in the increases and reductions of the price 
of food products in response to changes in the world price of major agricultural commodities. 
The results of this consultation are summarized in EU (2009). Despite high concentration ratios 
at the retail level in many countries, the degree of competition was found to be intense, and no 
national competition authority saw a need for (or had taken) action against retailers for taking 
part in horizontal anti-competitive agreements or engaging in abuse of dominance.  
While large retailers have buying power, in practice this is used in part to counteract the 
market power of major multinational food companies with strong brands. Insofar as retailers use 
their market power to bargain for better prices from suppliers that also have market power (the 
multinationals), the battle is over the distribution of rents.
15 Market power at any stage of the 
value chain can be expected to affect the distribution of the rents that accrue to the agents that are 
involved in the chain. Thus buyer power by retailers can be used to extract any rents from 
upstream producers –be they multinationals, wholesalers or farmers. However, while such rent 
shifting/extraction is obviously a matter that may be a policy concern and may motivate actions 
by either the upstream producers or the government to affect their distribution, from a 
competition (national welfare) perspective what matters is whether the exercise of buyer power 
results in higher consumer retail prices. If the effect is to lower final prices, independent of the 
effects on upstream prices (profits), there is not a problem from a competition perspective—to 
the contrary.  
Much depends therefore on whether exercise of market power along the value chain is 
likely to increase downstream prices. The exercise of monopsony power can be detrimental in 
this regard if it involves buying less from input suppliers (so as to reduce input prices paid), with 
the result that output available for downstream consumers is reduced, thereby generating higher 
prices. More generally, any cost savings may not be passed on to consumers. For this to occur 
                                                 
15 EU (2009) notes that in 2006, the average net profit margins of European retailers were around 4% as compared to 
margins for The Coca-Cola Company and Group Danone of some 20% and 11%, respectively. 15 
 
however there needs to be limited competition or significant barriers to entry, while as noted, the 
retail sector is characterized by very vigorous price competition.
16  The type of bilateral 
bargaining that occurs between large retailers and large producers of processed foods 
(multinationals) is unlikely to reduce output – in fact it may increase it by inducing suppliers to 
compensate for lower prices by producing more (OECD, 2008). 
The focus of competition policy enforcement is on consumer welfare of the country 
concerned (or the European Union in the case of the EU). Agencies do not have any scope to 
consider the effects of actions by firms on consumers in foreign markets outside their 
jurisdiction.  That the operation of value chains might result in intense price pressure on farmers 
in developing countries is not a matter of concern to competition agencies in importing countries. 
It may provide a justification for a case to be brought by competition authorities in the country 
that produces the commodities concerned – e.g., if processors impose onerous conditions on 
farmers, foreclose markets, etc. In practice a noncompetitive market structure along the 
production chain can have adverse price consequences for farmers. The absence of effective 
competition authorities in a country may result in lower output and investment by producers and 
raise prices for consumers. 
In many developing countries producers are smallholders who depend on a small number 
of buyers that have market power (oligopsony) and are thus able to extract some of the surplus 
that the export market generates. Porto et al. (2011) find that greater competition among 
processors in a sample of African countries and export crops would benefit farmers by increasing 
farm gate prices. Matters are complicated however by the fact that buyers often also provide 
ancillary services and working capital (e.g., seeds). Pervasive market failures such as lack of 
access to credit mean that in practice processors may provide inputs to farmers in return for 
agreement to buy their harvest at a negotiated price. Given weak capacity to enforce contracts 
through the legal system, the feasibility of such arrangements may depend on the buyers having 
some market power. Porto et al. (2011) conclude that if such constraints (market failures) are 
taken into account, the benefits of greater competition are reduced, but the reductions relative to 
                                                 
16 One potential concern would be if the exercise of monopsony power lowers retail prices to such an extent that it 
forces competitors out of the market, allowing the surviving firm(s) to subsequently raise prices. As in the case of 
predation, the likelihood of such a scenario depends on the contestability of the market (which depends on factors 
such as how high entry and other fixed costs are). See Carstensen (2008) for a discussion of several antitrust cases 
that were brought in the US that involve allegations of anticompetitive effects from the exercise of buyer power. 16 
 
a benchmark without market failures are generally small. However there are exceptions, 
indicating that careful analysis is needed of the operation of a given market in a country.
17 
 
1.2  Natural resource markets 
As is true for agricultural markets, governments have a long history of intervening in markets for 
natural resources, both renewables and non-renewables.  Contrary to policies that affect 
agriculture – where import protection has tended to dominate – in the case of natural resources 
the focus has been much more on export restrictions.  Protection rates on imported non-
agricultural commodities tend to be relatively low because many of these commodities are 
intermediate inputs, for which powerful user industries apply pressure against high rates of 
protection.  On the export side, numerous countries have intervened on export markets in an 
effort either to raise export prices or to support specific industries. Export restrictions are 
sometimes also justified on environmental grounds, although any measures targeted efficiently to 
environmental problems would generally target production or consumption, rather than exports. 
Data reported in WTO (2010) suggest that it is mostly developing countries implement export 
restrictions. Export taxes on natural resources account for about one-third of all export taxes 
imposed—some 11 percent of world trade in natural resources is covered by such taxes, with 
timber, iron, copper, pearls and gemstones being among the most frequently affected.
18   
Although export restrictions are more frequently observed than import protection, the 
underlying motivations have been very similar, either exploiting market power (terms of trade) 
and or political economy/industrial policy—an effort to subsidize/tax certain industries or 
activities.  In cases where a country does not have the ability to affect its terms of trade, the 
objective underlying the use of export restrictions is frequently to subsidize the domestic 
processing or another downstream industry by providing it with access at less than world market 
prices.  Such support to specific industries may also be granted through direct subsidies or tax 
concessions. Many energy producers subsidize domestic consumption by charging nationals 
                                                 
17 See Delpeuch and Leblois (2011) for a recent example of such analysis. 
18 Export restrictions on natural resource products accounted for one-third of the 7,328 notified export restrictions in 
the time period covered by WTO (2010).  17 
 
below world market prices (e.g., the Russian gas example analyzed by Tarr, 2010). A key result 
is generally resource misallocation. 
OPEC is of course the longest-standing example of an effort among producers to 
restrict/manage supply with a view to raising the level of the world oil price, using production 
quotas as a means to reduce output and stabilize prices.  International agreements among 
producers to use export and production restrictions proved to be very difficult for virtually all 
other commodities (Raffaelli 1995) because of conflicts between suppliers, and the emergence of 
new suppliers who—quite rationally—preferred to free-ride on any price-enhancing supply or 
export restrictions imposed by existing suppliers. OPEC has proved more successful than the 
other commodity agreements for several reasons, including: (i) a relatively small number of 
major exporters; and (ii) that oil can be stored much more easily and economically than many 
other commodities—including simply by leaving more of it in the ground. While the specific 
instrument used to restrict output is a production quota, the frequent coupling of this measure 
with low consumer prices makes the policies of many producers more nearly analogous to an 
export tax regime. Importing countries have responded to the formation of OPEC through the 
imposition of ―countervailing‖ taxes so as to ensure that some of the rents that are created by the 
resulting increase in global oil prices accrue to them.  
As noted by Collier and Venables (2010), natural resource markets have a number of 
distinct features including the fixed location of resource endowments, the presence of resource 
rents (which can be large if world prices are far above marginal cost, which they often are), the 
finiteness of resource stocks, and that for some countries natural resources account for the lion‘s 
share of economic activity. National policies may generate not only current distortions but will 
also affect the market in the longer run—e.g., by determining incentives to develop and extract 
resources. Inappropriate policies may result in the inefficient allocation of exploration and 
production rights, excessive risks, and sub-optimal levels of exploration and development. They 
also note that imperfect competition, which generally implies a constant markup over marginal 
costs, is unlikely to create market distortions in the case of timing of exploitation of a natural 




2.  Measures Affecting the Volatility of Prices 
For a number of staple food commodities, many governments intervene in an attempt to reduce 
the volatility of domestic prices relative to world prices. In poor countries, this reflects the 
sensitivity of consumers and governments to volatile prices for important staple goods. Such 
measures can be shown to be a logical measure for individual poor countries concerned about the 
adverse impacts of high prices of staple foods on poor consumers (Gouel and Jean 2011).  
Historically, such policies have also been extensively used in high-income countries as well in an 
attempt to stabilize domestic prices. In Europe, the variable import levies used by the European 
Union were explicitly designed to stabilize domestic prices in the face of variations in domestic 
prices.  
 
Figure 4. The relationship between world prices and protection rates, South Asia rice % 
 
These policies are heavily used for key staples such as rice and wheat and result in a 
strong negative correlation for these commodities between real world prices and the nominal rate 
of assistance, as shown in Figure 4 for South Asia. While this can certainly help countries reduce 
the volatility of their domestic prices relative to world prices, there remains a serious collective-
action problem.  When many countries use this approach to stabilize their domestic prices 
relative to world prices, world prices become much more volatile. Price insulation cannot reduce 
the volatility of domestic prices, but only redistribute it between countries (see Martin and 19 
 
Anderson 2012). It is possible that such a set of interventions would lower the impacts of high 
prices on poverty by lowering prices in the countries where high prices have the greatest adverse 
impact on poverty. However, there is no guarantee that this would be the case. When, for 
instance, the EU used variable import levies to stabilize its domestic prices, this resulted in 
instability being exported to the rest of the world by some of the richest countries in the world. In 
the presence of this collective-action problem, only a policy that takes into account these 
interactions can reduce volatility without creating the beggar-thy-neighbor problem inherent in 
this type of policy response. 
When Martin and Anderson (2012) investigated the implications of countries‘ responses 
to the price surges for wheat and rice in 2008, they found that almost half the increase in the 
world price of rice could be explained by countries‘ attempts to insulate themselves from the 
primary shocks causing the world price of rice to rise. While some low and middle income 
countries were relatively successful in insulating themselves against the increases in world 
prices, domestic prices in low income countries in Africa rose almost as much as world prices 
did, suggesting that price volatility in many African countries may have been greater given 
insulating policies than it would have been otherwise—see Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Domestic and international price changes for rice, 2006-10 % 
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3.  Rule-making Implications and Priorities 
Many, if not most, of the policies that restrict agricultural imports are already the subject of 
WTO rules or are on the Doha negotiating table. Since its inception as the GATT in 1947, the 
multilateral trading system has focused on import barriers, with the twin objectives of reducing 
these barriers and making them less variable. If countries can be persuaded to lower their import 
barriers on a reciprocal basis, then it may be possible to make all of them better off. The 
GATT/WTO approach tries to lower protection and to make it less volatile by introducing 
comprehensive limits (bindings) on import barriers.  WTO disciplines are much less 
comprehensive when it comes to policies used to raise the price of exports, and there are no rules 
regarding what can be done to contest the cross-border effects of actions by firms that influence 
the level of prices of what they buy or sell internationally.  
The GATT/WTO is usually seen as an institution that facilitates the identification and 
implementation of cooperative solutions to reduce the adverse impacts on other participants in 
the trading system of unilaterally chosen policies. The key problem with unilateral policies is the 
costs they impose on trading partners through deterioration in their terms-of-trade or excessive 
volatility. Limits on both import protection and export taxation/restrictions can reduce such 
adverse terms of trade effects as well as distortions to production incentives that make the world 
market more susceptible to price shocks.  
The asymmetry in disciplines on import policies compared to export policies in the 
GATT/WTO has often been remarked upon (see, e.g., Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009 and 
references cited there). The incompleteness of the GATT contract on the export side may reflect 
the fact that a good part of the political support for the GATT/WTO as an institution comes from 
mercantilist thinking. From a mercantilist perspective, a competing supplier country introducing 
export barriers becomes a less effective competitor, creating greater opportunities for home firms 
to export. If other WTO members are also motivated by mercantilist goals, they will be loath to 
introduce export barriers, which have a direct, adverse impact on export success. Perhaps as a 
result, there are few restrictions on the use of export taxes in the GATT and the disciplines on 
quantitative export restrictions are not comprehensive.  21 
 
The recent upsurge in the use of export barriers suggests that the general mercantilist 
reluctance to restrict trade cannot be taken for granted when world prices of food rise, or when 
there is a significant increase in global demand for scarce natural resources. In this situation, 
many governments may place a higher weight on the welfare of consumers and downstream 
industries than on the welfare of upstream producer interests (farmers, miners, etc.) when 
deciding whether to use export restrictions or taxes. The likelihood of more frequent use of 
export restrictions may rise as emerging markets continue to experience high rates of economic 
growth and this generates greater demand for meat and dairy products and for raw materials.  
Article XI of the GATT prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions, whether on imports 
or on exports. However, it allows for quantitative restrictions on trade in agricultural 
commodities if concurrent measures are also taken to restrict domestic production. Moreover, 
Art. XI:2(a) permits temporary restrictions to prevent critical shortages of food or other goods. 
This exception appears to have been interpreted relatively broadly in justifying the application or 
threat of export barriers, in cases such as the US proposal for an export ban on soybeans in 
1973.
19 Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture (WTO 1995, p. 51) requires that developed 
members and net-exporting developing-country members introducing export restrictions under 
this provision take into account the implications for importing members‘ food security, and to 
notify the Committee on Agriculture, preferably in advance. However, it appears that this has 
rarely been done—the most recent notification is reportedly from Hungary in 1997 (Gamberoni 
and Newfarmer, 2008). 
Not all WTO members have been happy with the absence of effective disciplines on 
export barriers. Countries depending heavily on the world market for food worry they might be 
vulnerable to export controls or taxes imposed by their suppliers.  Not surprisingly, such 
countries have pushed for disciplines on export controls and taxes (Congo 2001, Japan 2000, 
Jordan 2001, Korea 2001 and Switzerland 2000). Some of these proposals were far reaching: for 
example, the Jordan proposal was to ban export restrictions and bind all export taxes at zero. The 
proposal by Japan involved disciplines similar to those on the import side, with export 
restrictions to be replaced by taxes and export taxes to be bound. Recognizing that importers' 
concerns about the reliability of supply might inhibit liberalization, some exporting countries 
                                                 
19 In the recent WTO dispute concerning export restrictions on basic materials brought against China the panel 
rejected the argument that the measures could be justified under this provision. 22 
 
have also advocated multilateral restrictions on the right to use export restrictions. In the 
preliminary negotiations on agriculture held between 1999 and 2001 under Article 20 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture, the Cairns Group (2000) and the United States (2000) 
put forward proposals for disciplines on export barriers and/or taxes.  
These proposals languished for a long time in the Doha negotiations on agriculture. The 
Doha Ministerial declaration (WTO 2001) that provided the framework for the negotiations did 
not discuss the issue of disciplines on export taxes or restrictions. Similarly, the Framework 
Agreement (WTO 2004) mentioned the issue only in very general terms. However, the draft 
Modalities of May 2008 (WTO 2008b) included some quite specific disciplines on the use of 
export prohibitions and restrictions under Article XI.2(a). In particular, existing restrictions 
would be eliminated by the end of the first year of the implementation period, and members 
would be required to notify and provide reasons for any new measures within 90 days of their 
invocation. In April 2008, Japan and Switzerland (2008) proposed incorporating stronger 
disciplines on the use of export restrictions in the WTO.   
Fears of inadequate access to supplies in resources-scarce countries and of inappropriate 
exploitation in resource-rich regions have significant potential to generate trade conflicts and 
create negative spillovers for the world as a whole (WTO, 2010). Responses by importers to 
actions by exporters to restrict supply – whether the government does so directly though a tax or 
other type of policy, or allows firms based in its jurisdiction to exploit their market power in 
foreign markets (through an export cartel for example) – may result in some of the rents being 
shifted from exporters to importers, but the net result for world welfare is negative. The 
negotiating agenda here is rather straightforward and revolves around agreeing on a ban on 
export quotas and on binding commitments on export taxes and equivalent disciplines on export 
cartels.  
Given that countries that have the ability to set prices have an incentive to do so, affected 
trading partners will have to be willing to engage in quid pro quo negotiations and offer 
concessions to the countries that currently benefit from being able to impose export restrictions. 
In principle this is of course exactly what the WTO is set up to do. The challenge is to design a 
negotiating agenda out of which Pareto-improving deals can be constructed. Despite the 
difficulty in concluding the Doha Round – which in part is arguably a result of a negotiating 23 
 
agenda that does not offer enough in the way of potential Pareto-improving deals – the history of 
negotiations under the GATT indicates that this is a challenge that can be met.  
As noted by WTO (2010) efforts to agree to rules and commitments on the use of export 
taxes (and export cartels) affecting natural resource products should extend to seeking agreement 
on what is permissible and desirable from the perspective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and sustainable development. Governments are employing a wide array of instruments that aim 
to ―green‖ production, including direct subsidies (e.g., for alternative fuels) and tax concessions 
of different kinds, as well as indirect taxes on consumption (e.g., on gasoline).
20 Such domestic 
policies can also substitute for and have the same effects as trade measures so that agreement on 
the use of such policies are also beneficial from the perspective of reducing the potential for 
disputes. Recent WTO disputes brought against China and Canada are illustrative. While the 
panel in the case on Chinese export restrictions ruled that export taxes and other restrictions for 
basic industrial materials such bauxite, coke, and zinc could not be justified on grounds of 
safeguarding the environment (because they were not applied to domestic producers (which 
could have been achieved by a general restriction on production/extraction) and were not 
essential products for which there is a critical shortage (which may justify quantitative 
restrictions under GATT Article XI), clarifying what is and what is not allowed to achieve 
national environmental objectives is clearly important.
21  
Imperfect competition, market power, and high levels of concentration characterize some 
commodities markets and may result in price distortions.  At the national level competition 
policy and/or regulation is the appropriate instrument to address uncompetitive behavior that 
may result in distorted pricing. From a global rule-making perspective the question is what 
international cooperation can do to address the cross-border negative spillovers that are created 
                                                 
20 Policies to stimulate the use of biofuels are a good example. Domestic subsidies; tax credits or mandates for the 
use of particular types of biofuels are generally consistent with GATT rules. Protection measures designed to 
encourage the use of domestically produced biofuels are subject to WTO rules on binding of tariffs and other duties 
and charges, and would normally be expected to be subject to reductions in protection under the Doha Agenda 
negotiations through lowering agricultural (ethanol) or non-agricultural (biodiesel) tariffs. One surprising feature of 
the Doha negotiations is that the protection of ethanol—which diverts the sourcing of ethanol from lowest-cost 
international sourcing to reliance on domestically-produced maize—was not subject to significant proposed tariff 
reductions because almost all of this protection is provided by a measure classified as an Other Duty and Charge. 
21 China was subject to stricter rules on export restrictions than apply to other WTO members as it made specific 
commitments not to use such policies in its accession protocol, which the panel argued invalidated China‘s ability to 
invoke the general exceptions clause of the WTO (Art. XX). The case illustrates that even if rules are agreed it will 
also be necessary to define when what may be regarded as ―substitute‖ policy instruments are in fact permissible. 24 
 
by the behavior of firms located in a foreign country (or, in the case of multinationals, that are 
subject to multiple jurisdictions). As discussed above, ―competition issues‖ may arise in the 
operation of both food and non-food commodity markets, but are more likely in the case of 
natural resources because production and/or exports of such resources often involves a relatively 
small number of large firms (many of which may also have strong links to the state). Some 
markets – most notably for oil—are effectively cartelized. Market power and oligopoly have a 
number of implications, including possible foreclosure of markets for more efficient foreign 
producers. Also important in terms of welfare impacts is likely to be political uncertainty and 
risk that precludes efficient investment and generates inefficient forms of trade (Collier and 
Venables, 2010; WTO, 2010).  
Competition policy was one of the three Singapore issues suggested for negotiation at the 
1996 WTO Ministerial Meeting that eventually were taken off the table at the 2003 Cancun 
ministerial. Hoekman and Saggi (2006) argue that one reason was that the focus of discussions 
and potential negotiations were not clearly on negative spillovers or market access constraints 
associated with a set of policies. Instead most of the deliberations revolved around competition 
policy per se and the benefits of adopting such policies—something that can and has been 
implemented by countries autonomously. Most proposals stressed national enforcement-related 
disciplines, including as a mechanism through which to deal with the effects of international 
cartels (including export cartels). International cooperation to address negative spillovers caused 
by national competition policy enforcement was to be on a voluntary basis. 
  Arguably any effort to negotiate rules of a competition policy nature must address 
situations that involve private sector behavior that gives rise to cross-border negative 
externalities. Antitrust exemptions for export cartels are an obvious example (Hoekman and 
Saggi, 2007), as are international cartels.  The latter are already subject to national antitrust law. 
A number of major cases in recent years against global cartels connected with the food industry 
have illustrated the importance of active enforcement and international cooperation between 
competition authorities.
22 As regards export cartels, a distinction should be made between cartels 
that involve States and cartels of private firms. The former may be an efficient mechanism if the 
product concerned is a non-renewable natural resource (Collier and Venables 2010). In any 
                                                 
22 See e.g., Connor (2000), Bolotova, Connor and Miller (2005; 2008) and Connor and Helmers (2006). 25 
 
event, it is unlikely that any effort to declare such arrangements illegal will be feasible to 
negotiate given that for many of the producing countries the natural resources represent a major 
source of national wealth.  
In many of the areas that are sometimes mentioned as potentially giving rise to 
competition concerns there is significant uncertainty/ambiguity whether a practice, level of 
market concentration, prevailing market structure, etc. should be of concern i.e., affects price 
levels or generates excessive volatility. The discussion about the effects of monopsony power of 
large retailers and supermarkets is an example. This suggests a first priority is to compile much 
better data and to undertake a concerted effort to identify negative cross-border spillovers and 
analyze whether these should be accepted (as in the case of cooperation between countries in the 
case of non-renewable natural resources such as oil). Thus, greater transparency and analysis 
should be part of any forward-looking program of work in the WTO. 
  What matters most?  Import protection? Export restrictions? Private restrictive business 
practices?  The agenda on import protection is well understood and is already squarely on the 
agenda of the WTO and on the table in Doha. Making progress in further disciplining the scope 
to use import barriers is important – the estimated welfare gains from lowering applied levels of 
protection and bringing down tariff bindings are significant. But extending the effort to agree on 
disciplines on export restrictions is equally important, not least because the current greater ability 
of countries to use export restrictions is likely to have a direct bearing on the willingness of 
many importing countries to accept greater disciplines on their freedom to use import policies to 
support an increase in domestic production. An immediate priority is to agree on a code of 
conduct to exempt food aid from export restrictions. 
  Of particular importance in moving forward to negotiate disciplines on export restrictions 
is to apply the approach to rule-making that is already embedded in the WTO: to prefer 
instruments that are based on the price system over those that constrain quantities. Disciplines in 
the WTO today have greater bite on quantitative restrictions on exports than on the use of export 
taxes. From an efficiency and transparency perspective this is positive feature of the status quo. 
It suggests an approach that involves a process of negotiating commitments (bindings) on export 
taxes while strengthening the disciplines on the use of quantitative limitations. The data that 
were summarized previously on the trends in agricultural policies reveal that the level of export 26 
 
taxation today in many developing countries is far less than it was several decades ago. This 
suggests that an important service the WTO can provide to these countries is to act as a 
mechanism to lock in the current situation. While much media attention has been devoted to the 
use of export measures for rare earths and other industrial material inputs, it is important to 
recognize that the use of export taxation was much more prevalent in the past – suggesting that 
there is also scope for a reversal of this trend.  
Recent developments illustrate that the countries are making greater use of export 
restrictions (Datt, Hoekman and Malouche, 2011). The Global Trade Alert initiative has 
documented an increasing number of cases of developing countries putting in place new 
restrictions (Evenett, 2011). The increasing use of export restrictions by more advanced 
developing countries is worrisome (Gillson and Datt, 2011). Winters (2011) argues that efforts to 
negotiate disciplines on export restrictions need to recognize that governments are unlikely to 
accept binding restrictions on export taxes if this precludes them from taking action in 
―emergency‖ situations. He therefore suggests negotiations to cap export taxes be complemented 
with a safeguard-type analogue that imposes a process and procedures under which taxes can be 
raised above caps for a limited period of time. Criteria would need to be agreed on what types of 
events could trigger the safeguards, procedures agreed on verifying whether the criteria are 
satisfied, and mechanisms put in place that would help governments to manage the political 
economy. As is the case for import safeguard procedures or antidumping, agreement on criteria 
for invoking the mechanism would not only enhance transparency but remove the threat of tit-
for-tat retaliation.  
  At the end of the day the WTO is an incomplete contract and will remain one. In practice 
there will always be ways in which a government can change the relative magnitude of support 
or taxation for some industries. This suggests that the focus should be on the policies that are 
most detrimental – impose the largest negative spillovers on trading partners. Economic first 
principles suggest that these will be quantitative restrictions, not tax or price-based measures. 
But export taxes and restrictions are more pernicious than import tariffs because of the associated 
negative spillovers for the trading system in terms of greater volatility and the systemic costs of 
creating incentives for affected countries to ―self-insure‘ by taking actions to increase their self-
sufficiency. 27 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The current crisis illustrates how the world can end up with a set of policies that generate large 
distortions on global commodity markets.  Under normal agricultural conditions there are already 
major distortions in terms of costly taxpayer support to reduce imports and encourage production 
and exports.  Under abnormal global market conditions, such as those in 2007–8 and 2010–11, 
exporters restrict exports while importers stimulate them through cuts in border protection. To a 
large degree, these attempts at insulating domestic prices from world price shocks are offset by 
the increases in world prices they create.  
What is needed is a system where both imports and exports remain free to flow in good 
times and bad.  This is especially important if trade is to remain a reliable avenue for food 
security.  If in bad times, importing countries are subject to the export-restricting actions of 
producing countries, they will consider trade an unreliable way of maintaining food security and 
will reconsider how to manage their agriculture; there will be a greater temptation to move 
toward more self-reliance as insurance against the bad times. And, if in good times, exporting 
countries cannot have access to markets because of import barriers and other subsidies, they will 
be reluctant to give up the right to restrict exports during bad times. 
Unfortunately, the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations as currently configured will 
not fully address these problems.  The Round has focused primarily on traditional forms of 
agricultural protection: trade barriers in the importing countries and subsidies to food production 
in high-income producing countries. While lowering bound tariffs will help reduce the 
destabilizing effects of insulating trade barriers, proposals to expand the use of safeguard 
measures could increase the variability of world prices. Proposals put forward in the Doha 
negotiations do contain some potentially valuable disciplines on the use of export restrictions 
that might help diminish their destabilizing impacts. Measures to reduce barriers to trade in 
environmental goods such as ethanol could also be important, although the fact that ethanol 
tariffs were effectively excluded from the negotiations on agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs 
means that protection on this product would need to be explicitly included if progress is to be 
made in reducing this distortion. 
Even in the event of a successful Doha Agenda negotiation, much more will remain to be 
done to discipline the use of policies that may both affect the level of prices and augment 28 
 
instability. Further attention will need to be given to enhancement of WTO disciplines on export 
restrictions. Export restrictions tend to (1) distort prices and the allocation of resources, therefore 
impeding investment and the supply-side response; (2) prevent local farmers from receiving the 
higher world market price for their production; (3) displace local production to crops that are not 
subject to export restrictions, therefore aggravating food security and price concerns; and (4) 
exacerbate the rise and fluctuations of global food prices, therefore creating a vicious incentive for 
trading partners to follow suit, curb exports, and hoard. As if not more important, by signaling that 
global markets cannot be relied upon to function, export controls create incentives for importing 
countries to subsidize domestic production, resist binding commitments on the level of import 
protection/domestic support and more generally emulate the types of policies that have been 
pursued in many high-income OECD countries for agriculture. 
Export restrictions can help stabilize domestic prices in the exporting country but may do 
so at significant cost in terms of greater world price volatility and higher average prices for net 
importers. As trade liberalization generally takes a long period of time to be negotiated and 
implemented, there is in principle ample opportunity for governments to develop or strengthen 
safety-net programs and complementary policies to maintain real incomes of the poor. Such time 
does not exist in instances where there are acute shortages that are exacerbated by beggar thy 
neighbor export restrictions. But in such situations international trade policy rules, with their 
emphasis on imposing maximum barriers on tariffs are irrelevant for net importing countries – 
governments will likely want to lower tariffs, not raise them.  
The food price increases that occurred in 2007-08 – and the response by food exporters – 
revealed that an exclusive focus on liberalization on the import side and reducing domestic 
support is too narrow. Export restrictions and export taxes need to be on the WTO negotiating 
agenda. Current disciplines are weak – Art. XI GATT is permissive for agriculture export 
restraints, and export taxes are unconstrained. We have argued that there is a good case to focus 
attention first on strengthening the ban on the use of quantitative restrictions in Art. XI by 
making this unconditional, and on disciplining the scope to use export taxes through negotiating 
specific bindings, analogous to what has been done for import tariffs. As outlined in some policy 
proposals to WTO, such disciplines might incorporate negotiable restrictions on export barriers 
related to increases in world prices—a type of discipline on price insulation that has not featured 
in WTO measures for export restrictions in the past.  29 
 
Effective disciplines on export restrictions require that rules extend to export cartels that 
are sanctioned by home country jurisdictions. Active antitrust enforcement is important to 
combat international cartels. While these have been less prevalent and less detrimental in food-
related sectors when measured by the magnitude of overcharges than cartels in other sectors 
(Bolotova, Connor and Miller, 2005), the number of cartels that have been prosecuted clearly 
show that incentives to collude exist. Combating international cartels is largely an agenda for the 
major countries that have the institutional capacity to investigate and take action against the 
firms concerned. Much of the potential competition policy agenda is arguably at the country 
level. High prices of transport, logistics and other services are major sources of de facto taxation 
of farmers in developing countries, quite independent of any explicit taxes or implicit taxation 
resulting from a relative bias of policy against agriculture.  
The importance of greater competition along the supply chain in low income countries 
has already been stressed. A lack of competition and the exploitation of market power in relevant 
domestic markets—by buyers, processors, transporters, etc. – may result in excessively high 
prices of inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and logistics services that lower the return to farming. 
Research has shown that the degree of competition on both upstream (input) and downstream 
market segments affects the incentives confronting farmers to invest and improve productivity. 
This in turn can have implications for world markets by reducing global supply and thus putting 
upward pressure on prices. However, the economic literature has also shown that one cannot 
generalize – specific circumstances matter, firms with a dominant position may provide valuable 
services that would otherwise not be available as a result of institutional weaknesses and market 
failures, and so forth. Thus, one implication for multilateral cooperation looking forward is to 
invest more in monitoring and analyzing the operation of commodity markets, at the national 
level, at the level of global value chains, and internationally. 
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